Competing paradigms within modern political economy
- Authors: Levin S.1, Sablin K.2
-
Affiliations:
- Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation
- Russian State Institute of Performing Arts
- Issue: Vol 29, No 4 (2025)
- Pages: 53-67
- Section: Methodology of Economic Science
- Published: 10.11.2025
- URL: https://journal-vniispk.ru/2587-7666/article/view/353805
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.52342/2587-7666VTE_2025_4_53_67
- EDN: https://elibrary.ru/AEBXJT
- ID: 353805
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Abstract
The article is devoted to the comparative characteristics of classical and neoclassical paradigms within the framework of modern political economy, which is not an integrated concept based on uniform foundations, but it is a set of partially competing concepts. The authors identify their advantages and limitations. Classical paradigm characterizes political economy as a science of accumulation and distribution of national wealth. The economic behavior of individuals is analyzed in the context of their belonging to classes. State is considered as a structure whose utility functions reflect the economic interests of classes as well as a relatively independent arbiter of their coordination. On the other hand, neoclassical paradigm characterizes political economy as a science of utility maximization by individuals not only in economic markets but also in the political sphere, characterized by the presence of such resource as "power" in the form of legitimate violence. Their economic behavior is analyzed in the context of belonging to group interests, and state acts as a sphere in which individuals and interest groups realize their preferences through competition for access to resources that are not available within the framework of voluntary market exchange. In general, modern political economy includes both reactualized classical political economy and new political economy developing within the expanded mainstream. At the same time, one can say not only of competition, but also of the complementarity of these areas. It is noted that the protective belts of their research programs contain identical or similar components: overcoming the "gap" between the study of economics and politics; using sociological tools and econometric models; practice-oriented approach within the framework of elaborating normative proposals for the formation of effective options for organizing political and economic interaction.
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About the authors
Sergey Levin
Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation
Author for correspondence.
Email: levin.sergey.n@gmail.com
ORCID iD: 0000-0003-3881-3579
Doctor of Science (Econ.), Professor
Russia, MoscowKirill Sablin
Russian State Institute of Performing Arts
Email: sablin_ks@mail.ru
ORCID iD: 0000-0002-5478-7481
Cand. of Science (Econ.), Associate Professor
Russia, Saint-PetersburgReferences
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