Siberian Law Review

The article conducts a comparative analysis of perspectives held by key advocates of the right to a dignified life in Russia, while also critically reflecting on these viewpoints. This contributes to the ongoing discourse within contemporary Russian scholarship on the existence and implications of the right to a dignified life. To this end, the views of pre-revolutionary thinkers are considered including S. Solovyov, P. I. Novgorodtsev, I. A. Pokrovsky, B. A. Kistyakovsky and S. I. Gessen regarding the problem and their development. A comparative analysis of these perspectives highlights significant divergences on the following matters: 1) whether to acknowledge solely the right to life itself (as advocated by Pokrovsky) or the right to a dignified life (as argued by Novgorodtsev); 2) whether the right to a dignified life should remain solely a moral entitlement (as suggested by Solovyov) or also encompass a positive legal entitlement (as posited by Kistiakovsky); 3) whether the right to a dignified life necessitates a transition from capitalism to socialism (as proposed by Kistiakovsky) or not (as contended by Novgorodtsev). These thinkers have yet to resolve several fundamental issues essential for substantiating any subjective right, whether moral or positive. Furthermore, the reliance of their proposed justifications on the socio-economic context prevents the recognition of the right to a dignified life as natural, unconditional, and inalienable. To address these issues, the author draws upon the Western philosophical and legal tradition. It has been shown that Western scholars' efforts to establish the moral foundations of human rights are closely tied to the aspiration of ensuring a decent standard of living for every individual. A common rationale for both firstand second-generation human rights lies in the challenges associated with justifying the right to a dignified life. These challenges highlight the broader difficulties in justifying human rights as a whole. As a potential solution to the aforementioned challenges, it is suggested to view socio-economic rights solely as a mechanism for safeguarding personal and political rights, rather than as a means to guarantee a "dignified" life. But in this case, the right to a dignified life is unlikely to be classified as a universal human right.

The article highlights that the distinctive features of administrative and procedural legal relationships encompass not only their underlying causes but also their substance and participants. Considering the content of administrative procedural legal relations, attention should be paid to the nature and essence of the administrative process as a law enforcement activity. One of the unique aspects of administrative procedural legal relationships, as a form of law enforcement in the public domain, is that one of the parties involved will always be an individual vested with not just procedural powers, but also authority over other participants in the administrative process. Consequently, such relationships assume a public and authoritative character, where the dominant participant in administrative and procedural legal relations advocates not merely their personal rights and obligations, but rather the interests of the state and society. It is also noted that the basis of administrative procedural activity as a type of legal activity is the commission of administrative procedural actions, and not procedures, as many procedural scientists assume. In this context, it is worth noting that the foundation of any law enforcement endeavor lies in the execution of legally significant actions, leading to the emergence of legal consequences. At the same time, the procedure cannot be used as the basis of a legal process, since it itself consists of actions. Therefore, dividing the procedure into material and procedural is a mistake. The paper proposes that categorizing proceedings for the preparation, adoption, and publication of normative legal acts as part of the administrative process is contentious. This is because this type of procedure significantly diverges from other administrative proceedings in terms of objectives, stages, and the types of decisions made within its framework. However, it has a procedural nature, but together with the legislative process, it should most likely be combined in the rule-making process rather than be included in the administrative process. The methodological basis of the article is dialectical, formal-logical methods, formallegal method and method of interpretation of law.