Pareto-Like Equilibria for Differential Games with Side Interests of the Players


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For dynamic and static problems with side interests of the participants, new concepts of conflict equilibrium are proposed, which make it possible to find a solution that most satisfies all the participants, especially in those problems in which all known concepts of equilibrium turn out to be ineffective or unsuitable.

作者简介

E. Smol’yakov

Lomonosov Moscow State University

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Email: ser-math@rambler.ru
俄罗斯联邦, Moscow, 119991

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