Pareto-Like Equilibria for Differential Games with Side Interests of the Players
- Autores: Smol’yakov E.R.1
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Afiliações:
- Lomonosov Moscow State University
- Edição: Volume 53, Nº 12 (2017)
- Páginas: 1654-1666
- Seção: Control Theory
- URL: https://journal-vniispk.ru/0012-2661/article/view/154653
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S0012266117120126
- ID: 154653
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Resumo
For dynamic and static problems with side interests of the participants, new concepts of conflict equilibrium are proposed, which make it possible to find a solution that most satisfies all the participants, especially in those problems in which all known concepts of equilibrium turn out to be ineffective or unsuitable.
Sobre autores
E. Smol’yakov
Lomonosov Moscow State University
Autor responsável pela correspondência
Email: ser-math@rambler.ru
Rússia, Moscow, 119991
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