The Views of Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio on Japan’s Foreign Policy Within the Context of the Search for a New Grand Strategy

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In July 2023, a group of eleven Japanese academics and international relations experts published a report titled “Asia’s Future at a Crossroads: a Japanese Strategy for Peace and Sustainable Prosperity”. The document, which is a product of almost five years of deliberation, posits the need for Japan to formulate an alternative foreign policy strategy to the government’s current approach amid intensifying US-China strategic competition and shifting security environment in East Asia¹. The authors argue that the Kishida Fumio administration’s emphasis on power politics (including Japan’s military capabilities) and strengthening the US-Japan alliance, both of which are reflected in the 2022 national security strategy, might result in the region becoming more divided and increase the likelihood of a conflict between the US and China.

As an alternative, the report suggests a strategy based on the idea of shinbei jiritsu, or pro-US autonomy, i. e. an independent foreign policy which gravitates towards the USA but does not rely on it entirely. While strengthening security ties with the USA, Japan should also develop relations with countries in the region that are not American allies or partners. According to the authors, Tokyo should acknowledge the diversity of political systems and socio-cultural traditions in the Asia-Pacific and deepen cooperation with “middle powers” such as South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, India, and ASEAN states.

While the suggestions put forward in this report diverge from the foreign policy trajectory that Japan has been following for about 15 years, they have much in common with the vision of Japanese diplomacy proposed by Hatoyama Yukio from the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), who served as prime minister in 2009–2010. By leading his party to victory in the August 2009 general election, Hatoyama broke the almost uninterrupted 50-year-long monopoly on power held by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), however, his administration was plagued by a lack of coordination, inexperience, and internal conflicts². By far the biggest point of criticism was his foreign policy.

Hatoyama’s calls for Japan to rely less of the US and conduct independent foreign policy were met in the USA with confusion and frustration. His pledge to relocate the US marine base on Futemma outside of the Okinawa prefecture contradicted both the agreements reached between the two countries under the LDP and the DPJ’s own manifesto, becoming a stumbling block between Japan’s new government and the Obama administration. The resulting tensions in the bilateral ties were a major factor that led to the prime minister’s resignation in June 2010. Hatoyama’s attempts to improve relations with China were met with Beijing’s indifference, while his East Asian Community concept based on nebulous ideas of mutual trust and cooperation failed to make an impression on the countries in the region which were satisfied with the existing US hegemony³.

Some of Hatoyama’s initiatives were even met with opposition from fellow DPJ members and his administration’s approval ratings were on a constant decline, so the prime minister did not wield enough authority and influence to achieve his goals. Under those circumstances, the scope of his foreign policy’s failure was such that the following prime ministers Kan Naoto and Noda Yoshihiko were busy with restoring stable ties with the USA rather than introducing their own ideas.

The analysis of Japan’s foreign policy under Hatoyama typically emphasises the prime minister’s lack of experience in matters of diplomacy, while his vision of Japan’s role in the world and desire to distance it from the USA is called “naïve”⁴, “idealistic”⁵, or even “starry-eyed”⁶. While acknowledging that some of Hatoyama’s ideas were unorthodox by the standards of Japan’s political establishment and his rhetoric at times lacked thoughtfulness, this article posits that the prime minister pursued the same general goals in foreign policy as other Japanese leaders, namely finding a balance between strong relations with the US and stable ties with the rising China. Furthermore, despite Hatoyama’s diplomacy proving incompatible with regional security environment, his vision of an autonomous Japan that rejects unilateral orientation towards the US, maintains friendly relations with China, and highlights its Asian identity can be interpreted as an alternative grand strategy for Japan, different from both the Yoshida doctrine, which was prevalent during the Cold War, and the trajectory charted by the first Abe Shinzo administration (2006–2007) and continued by Hatoyama’s successors.

Japan is currently facing an increasingly fraught security environment. US-China strategic rivalry causes tensions in the region; North Korea’s developing ballistic and nuclear programmes enhance the possibility of conflict between Tokyo and Pyongyang; and the rapprochement between Moscow and Beijing, as well as the increase in Russian military activity near the South Kuril Islands, is a matter of much concern for Japan. As the aforementioned Japanese scholars argue, Japan’s present trajectory towards bolstering its military capabilities, strengthening the alliance with the USA to the detriment of its own regional initiatives, and promoting the ideologically-charged Free and Open Indo-Pacific framework risks not only failing to mitigate US-China confrontation but escalating it even further. Therefore, it is worth examining Hatoyama’s ideas of a more moderate Japanese foreign policy which would not rely excessively on the US and promote integration with East Asian states.

This article analyses Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio’s views on Japan’s foreign policy within the context of post-Cold War debates regarding the country’s new grand strategy. It breaks down disparate foreign policy views held by DPJ members into several groups on the ideological basis and highlights the key elements of the party’s diplomatic agenda. It then examines the personal views of Hatoyama himself, to what extent they were influenced by existing foreign policy frameworks, and how the prime minister approached the policy-making process. It also identifies the similarities and differences between the foreign policy priorities put forth by Hatoyama and the Yoshida doctrine, as well as alternative strategies proposed in the 1990s. Finally, drawing on the issue of the Futemma base relocation, it demonstrates how the prime minister’s inexperience and propensity for voicing his own opinion on an issue without reaching consensus within his party led to a significant rift in the US-Japan relations.

Before analysing Hatoyama’s views on Japan’s diplomacy and its global role, it is worth examining the DPJ foreign policy platform. Hatoyama is the only DPJ prime minister who possessed a certain political philosophy and whose foreign policy positions have been well documented since the 1990s, however, his own views hardly represented the agenda of the party at large — ever since its inception in 1996, the DPJ was characterised by its members’ disparate stances and ideologies. Hatoyama himself used to a member of the LDP, while his successor Kan belonged to the Socialist Democratic Federation, and Ozawa Ichiro changed several parties before joining the DPJ (LDP, Japan Renewal Party, New Frontier Party, and finally Liberal Party). Unsurprisingly, the presence of so many experienced politicians from different backgrounds meant that the DPJ consisted of several loosely tied groups, which often held conflicting views on issues⁷. Unlike the LDP factions, groups within the DPJ did not have a rigid internal structure and were not tied by strict disciplinary regulations. They were, however, more divided along ideological lines.

From a foreign policy standpoint, it is possible to break down the DPJ politicians into four schools of thoughts: realists, pacifists, centrists, and neo-autonomists⁸. The realists, who included Noda, were relatively small in number, consisted primarily of younger party members, and supported a strong US-Japan alliance, as well as reinterpreting the constitution to allow Japan the right to collective self-defence. Pacifists opposed revising the constitution, envisioned only a minor international security role for Japan, and supported Asian regionalism. Centrists, who included Kan, did not have particularly strong foreign policy views, but generally leaned towards the traditional LDP brand of diplomacy, often shifting to more pragmatic, moderate stances once in power. Finally, the neo-autonomists were in favour of an independent Japanese foreign policy, neither relying on the US (which they perceived to be in the decline), nor being drawn into China’s orbit. They embraced the idea of an East Asian Community as a balancing option against Japan’s overreliance on the USA and generally espoused a liberal view of the international system, dealing with threats through integrating them into multilateral institutions. The most notable proponent of neo-autonomism was Hatoyama.

Despite the contending foreign policy views outlined above, the DPJ’s strategic vision can be summarised as follows: while the party acknowledged the US-Japan alliance as the cornerstone of Japan’s national security, it wanted to formulate such foreign policy that would make the country less dependent on the USA and instead be more Asia-oriented. This idea stemmed from three considerations.

Firstly, the DPJ leadership was weary of getting too entangled in American grand strategy and wanted to minimise the financial burden of joint military operations.

Secondly, the financial crisis of 2008 was viewed by many in the party as a portent of the declining US leadership and an end to the US-led brand of globalism. By 2009, there was a push among Japan’s political elite for greater engagement with East Asia as it was the first region to overcome the 2008 crisis⁹. Meanwhile the USA and Europe were hit the hardest and were not expected to recover quickly, thus precluding Japan from looking to them for ways of revitalising its own economy.

Finally, regional challenges facing East Asia had become more acute over the previous decade, with non-traditional issues such as environmental pollution, natural disasters, and terrorism becoming more pressing. As such, the DPJ believed that the US-Japan alliance is not sufficient anymore in fully guaranteeing Japan’s security and that the new security and economic environment necessitated closer engagement with neighbouring East Asian states. In essence, the DPJ strategy under Hatoyama involved a shift from a unilateral, US-oriented diplomacy to a broader, multilateral approach focused on East Asian regionalism.

It is worth emphasising that despite having an image of a more “dovish” party than the LDP as far as foreign policy was concerned, the DPJ, too, envisioned a bigger international role for Japan, supporting a departure from the “inward-looking” pacifism of the past towards an “outward-looking” pacifism, allowing Japan to be more proactive in contributing to global security¹⁰. However, rather than promoting greater military cooperation with the USA, the DPJ under Hatoyama prioritised traditional non-military means such as economic assistance, support of government institutions, and humanitarian and reconstruction activities.

Such vision of Japan’s role on the international stage was not unique to Hatoyama and his party, sharing common elements with two concepts first proposed in the 1990s. During the Cold War, Japan’s grand strategy was embodied by the so-called Yoshida doctrine named after Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru who formulated its principles. The three key elements of the strategy were near total reliance on the USA for national security, prioritising economic development, and low-profile, passive diplomacy¹¹. With the end of the Cold War and the shift in the international relations structure, Japan was faced with the task of adapting its grand strategy to new geopolitical realities, and it is precisely the search for alternatives to the Yoshida doctrine that the two concepts influencing the DPJ’s foreign policy positions represented.

The first was human security, a strategy introduced by the Obuchi Keizo administration in 1998 and based on the belief that Japan should take on more responsibilities towards upholding global security, shaping the international economic order, and assisting developing countries¹². At the same time, the proponents of human security opposed Japan’s remilitarisation, suggesting that an increase in defence spending would not necessarily result in a more secure Japan but can rather spark concerns among Japan’s East Asian neighbours. As an alternative, they proposed a mixture of traditional non-military means such as the Official development assistance (ODA) programme and new security activities such as the UN peacekeeping operations.

The second concept that had an effect on the DPJ’s foreign policy agenda under Hatoyama is the notion of Japan as a global civilian power introduced around the same time by journalist Funabashi Yoichi. In Funabashi’s view, Japan’s unique status as the only pacifist state in the world should form the basis of its diplomacy, while its goal should be using economic means and promoting democratic values to shape the liberal international order. The global civilian power initiative also entailed reducing the defence budget, as well as Japan playing a secondary, “auxiliary” role in the US global strategy¹³. One could therefore trace the influence of these two concepts’ elements, i. e. emphasis on non-military means of upholding security, opposition to remilitarisation, desire to avoid complete dependence on American foreign policy, on the DPJ’s diplomatic agenda.

The aforementioned Ozawa Ichiro also played a notable role in discussions within Japan regarding a new strategy suited for post-Cold War threats and challenges. From early 1990s onwards, Ozawa stated that Japan should become a “normal” country, meaning that its power and influence on the international stage should be commensurate with its status as an economic superpower. Ozawa criticised the Yoshida doctrine’s “passive pacifism”, arguing that Japan should strive to achieve more prestige in the global arena, and supported constitutional reform that would enable the country to participate in the collective security system¹⁴.

As far as Hatoyama’s own ideas on politics, both domestic and foreign, are concerned, they were underpinned by a nebulous philosophy of yuai, or fraternity. The concept was originally introduced by Hatoyama Ichiro, the prime minister’s grandfather, who defined yuai as a philosophy that respected individual freedom and dignity, as well as those of others. Under yuai, people respect each other’s independence and diversity, while searching for a common basis for cooperation¹⁵. Hatoyama Yukio wrote that, applied to politics, yuai would entail adjusting to the excesses of capitalism and supporting traditional Japanese economic practices. The prime minister pushed the idea of deeper political and economic integration with neighbouring countries under the banner of an East Asian Community also based on the principle of yuai, which meant understanding and engaging those countries despite ideological differences¹⁶.

Hatoyama’s views were particularly influenced by academic Terashima Jitsuro who became Hatoyama’s foreign policy advisor. Terashima argued that Japan should be proud of its post-war pacifist history and strengthen ties with East Asian states. He suggested that the present international balance of power reflected rivalry between the US and China, envisaged Japan as the third side of that triangle, and suggested that Japan should abandon its unilateral reliance on America¹⁷. Hatoyama argued along similar lines, writing in 1997 that “Japan has always depended on the US in foreign policy, which may have been appropriate during the Cold War, but now Japan is simply following the US blindly, while new realities require formulating and implementing an independent foreign policy.” In a piece for The New York Times called “A New Path for Japan” published several days ahead of the 2009 general election, Hatoyama acknowledged the US-Japan alliance as the bedrock of Japanese diplomacy, but stressed Japan’s Asian identity and suggested that East Asia should be “recognized as Japan’s basic sphere of being”¹⁸. Arguing that the US-led unipolar world order was declining, he pointed to China as the emerging superpower and proposed to accelerate East Asian regional integration in order to both protect Japan’s independence and pursue national interests as a country caught between the US and China. In effect, Hatoyama argued that an East Asia-oriented diplomacy would be better suited for Japan’s national interests than a US-centric one.

Having outlined Hatoyama’s views on Japan’s foreign policy priorities, it is now possible to juxtapose them with other major contemporary concepts and initiatives. The foreign policy agenda put forward by Hatoyama certainly deviated from the views of such neoconservative LDP leaders as Koizumi Junichiro, Abe Shinzo, or Aso Taro, who were highly critical of China, supported broadening the scope of the Self-Defence Forces’ capabilities, and were in favour of strengthening security cooperation with the USA. By contrast, Hatoyama argued against Japan’s remlitarisation and increasing defence spending, supported constraints on the Self-Defence Forces’ use of force, and thought that Japan should contribute to international security by non-military means.

As mentioned before, these stances were influenced by the human security and global civilian power concepts that also emphasised economic diplomacy and modest defence budgets. At the same time, Funabashi’s global civilian power strategy suggested that Japan should play an “auxiliary” role in the US-Japan alliance, while Hatoyama argued for reviewing the parameters of the bilateral relations so that Japan could play a more equal, independent role in them. That brought him closer to his fellow DPJ member Ozawa, who also thought that Japan should conduct a more independent foreign policy. However, Ozawa supported Japan’s “normalisation” and considered Japanese pacifism as a source of shame rather than pride, whereas Hatoyama was an avowed pacifist, emphasising Japan’s status as a peace-loving nation, and his East Asian Сommunity idea was based not on attaining prestige or power but rather on historical reconciliation between regional states.

Therefore, Hatoyama’s strategic thinking was different from both the Yoshida doctrine which guided Japan’s foreign policy for several decades and the key alternatives to it proposed after the end of the Cold War. Hatoyama’s desire to correct Japan’s overreliance on the USA stood in contrast to the outsourcing of national security to America during the Cold War, while the “outward-looking” pacifism that he promoted seemed to go beyond the remit of Japan’s low-profile diplomacy under the Yoshida doctrine. Importantly, however, the autonomous foreign policy that Hatoyama was in favour of formulating did not entail Japan’s remilitarisation or loosening constitutional constraints on the use of force in armed conflicts, instead giving priority to free trade, humanitarian assistance, and other economic means.

For all of his somewhat unorthodox foreign policy views, Hatoyama generally operated within mainstream parameters in his approach to both the USA and China. Broadly speaking, he pursued largely the same goals as the prime ministers before and after him, striving to improve relations with China while maintaining a stable US-Japan alliance (for example, Hatoyama considered a strong alliance with the USA as a necessary condition for establishing an East Asian Community). The Hatoyama administration also upheld many mainstream views, with the prime minister underscoring the importance that Japan places on common values during the December 2009 summit in Indonesia¹⁹, thus echoing the “values-based diplomacy” first introduced by the Abe administration in 2006. Additionally, in November 2009, Hatoyama gave a speech in Singapore, in which he called for maintaining peace at sea, thus delivering on the expectations of the ASEAN states²⁰. That particular speech was also noteworthy as it was written by the Japanese Foreign Ministry officials rather than Hatoyama’s usual speechwriter, playwright Oriza Hirata.

Despite Hatoyama belonging to a respected political dynasty, he possessed very limited experience and knowledge in diplomatic affairs, while his views on a particular matter often depended on whom he spoke to last²¹. Moreover, he was considered unpredictable on foreign policy issues even within his own party, as no one in the DPJ, including his inner circle, had a good grasp of what his foreign policy was going to look like as prime minister²². The East Asian Community concept, for example, reflected Hatoyama’s own views rather than the party’s consensus and was characteristic of his diplomacy, which was seemingly guided by personal decisions and on occasion belied the DPJ’s prior policy documents. While he had many advisors, some of them were not even members of the government, which caused controversy as Hatoyama’s opinions were at least partially shaped by people without relevant expertise or affiliation.

In conclusion, while the task of finding balance in Japan’s relations with the USA and China was as relevant for Hatoyama as it was for other prime ministers, the rhetoric he used to articulate his vision and the approach he chose to achieve his foreign policy goals set him apart from other Japanese leaders and were ultimately not conducive to realising his agenda. Hatoyama believed that the era of US hegemony was over and that Japan should follow the rising China instead, while his East Asian Community was supposed to counterbalance American dominance in the region²³. It is precisely this idiosyncrasy which distinguished Hatoyama from Japan’s political elites.

The Hatoyama government’s attempts to implement its foreign policy initiatives ended in failure. The East Asian Community concept put forth by the prime minister was too vague from structural, organisational, and ideological standpoints. Regional states reacted to it with scepticism as many of them were interested in stable US leadership, whereas America was excluded from Hatoyama’s proposed membership list. His attempts to improve ties with China had similar results — while then Vice President Xi Jinping supported the idea of an East Asian Community during his visit to Tokyo in December 2009, no further progress was achieved on that front. By early 2010, the Hatoyama administration’s rhetoric had changed, with Japan suggesting that China should conduct more responsible foreign policy and the East Asian Community proposal becoming a long-term plan²⁴. A Sino-Japanese rapprochement arguably became no longer feasible in March 2010, after the South Korean corvette “Cheonan” was sunk by a North Korean torpedo causing a heightening of tensions in the region.

The Hatoyama administration’s biggest fiasco was the prime minister’s unfulfilled pledge to relocate the US marine base Futemma. This issue is worth exploring in more detail for three reasons.

Firstly, it was Hatoyama’s failure to tackle this issue specifically that caused him to resign after only nine months in office.

Secondly, while the new administration’s East Asian Community proposal became the first red flag for the USA, Hatoyama’s insistence on moving the base outside of Okinawa caused the Obama administration to view the prime minister with distrust. As a result, Hatoyama presided over the period of perhaps the greatest discord in the bilateral relations²⁵.

Thirdly, the inexperience, incompetence and lack of cohesion demonstrated by his administration in approaching this issue were characteristic of many of its other policies and cemented the negative perception of Hatoyama’s premiership by both experts and Japanese public.

The Futemma base located in Ginowan city within the Okinawa prefecture housed the majority of US forward deployment forces. The question of its relocation first arose in the 1990s, and in 2006, the LDP government and the Bush administration reached an agreement that involved relocating the base to Nago city in another part of Okinawa. However, in July 2009, Hatoyama made a pledge that he would get Futemma relocated outside of the prefecture (kengai), repeating it on several occasions later that year. The DPJ manifesto, also published in July, notably did not contain such pledge. Hatoyama optimistically thought that the US would respect his demand because he incorrectly interpreted the mood in Washington, believing that its foreign policy prioritised Afghanistan and Iran²⁶.

However, as the US was not open to any significant change to the parameters of its military presence on Okinawa, Hatoyama’s rhetoric caused frustration in the Obama administration, especially because the Japanese leader’s statements directly contradicted the 2006 agreement. Furthermore, Hatoyama’s nebulous calls for conducting independent foreign policy and building US-Japan relations on an equal basis created an impression in the US that he supported a fundamental revision of the principles of Japan’s diplomacy. As a result, it was not long after Hatoyama had begun his tenure as prime minister that the Obama administration started viewing him as an unreliable partner at best and an anti-US figure at worst, which in turn negatively impacted the way it perceived Hatoyama’s other foreign policy initiatives.

An additional factor causing frustration in the USA was that the Hatoyama government did not relay information regarding its changing stance on the Futemma relocation issue on a regular and timely basis and kept postponing the start of negotiations so that the inexperienced DPJ politicians had enough time to familiarise themselves with the problem.

Finally, as in the case of Hatoyama’s East Asian Community vision, his intention of negotiating Futemma’s relocation outside of Okinawa reflected his personal views as there was no consensus on that issue within the DPJ. In contravention of the prime minister’s stance, the existing 2006 relocation plan was publicly supported by Defence Minister Kitazawa Toshimi, Foreign Minister Okada Katsuya, and Okinawa Governor Nakaima Hirokazu. Such inconsistency further undermined Hatoyama’s reputation in the eyes of the USA.

For Hatoyama, the significance of his pledge had likely to do with ideological considerations as he was eager to prove that Japan can act independently of the USA, while the question of implementation was secondary. In December 2009, he expressed hope of finding a new relocation place by May 2010, thus setting an unrealistic deadline for negotiations without prior consultation with the US. In January 2010, the government proposed the island of Tokunoshima as an alternative to Nago, but by April, it became clear that it was not a viable option as Tokunoshima was not suitable for US marines’ training. Finally, during his visit to Okinawa in May, Hatoyama apologised to locals for having broken his pledge, adding that he had underestimated the US military deterrence function. Later that month, Japan and the USA signed a new agreement which essentially confirmed existing plans for moving Futemma to Nago, while Hatoyama, whose disapproval rating had reached 70%, announced his resignation on 2 June.

The consequences of Hatoyama’s disastrous foreign policy reached beyond himself, making it clear to his DPJ successors Kan and Noda that distancing from the US and conducting truly independent foreign policy was impossible in the current geostrategic environment. As a result, they returned Japan’s diplomacy to its traditional US-centric parameters. Furthermore, the Hatoyama administration’s inability to effectively solve pressing domestic and international issues left a mark on the following DPJ governments, which never regained public support and eventually lost the December 2012 general election, bringing the LDP back to power with Abe as its leader.

It has been over 13 years since Hatoyama Yukio resigned as prime minister. During this time, Japan’s policies of militarisation, broadening the Self-Defence Forces’ operational capabilities, and strengthening security ties with the USA and Indo-Pacific states have seemingly cemented themselves as the basis of its grand strategy. Hatoyama’s attempts of modifying Japan’s foreign policy priorities ended in failure, having damaged both the US-Japan alliance and the DPJ’s reputation. However, his tenure arguably marked Japan’s hitherto biggest attempted shift away from the Yoshida doctrine towards more autonomous foreign policy and proactive role on the global stage. Hatoyama’s foreign policy vision, which often went against the views of his own party, was based on the belief in an imminent end of the unipolar international order that necessitated improving relations with China and integrating with other East Asian states.

Hatoyama failed to implement his foreign policy goals because they were ill-suited to the changing regional security environment and were viewed sceptically by China, East Asian countries, and the USA alike. Since then, Japan’s assessment of the shifting international environment has only become more negative, with the latest national security strategy describing it as the most complex since World War II²⁷. In light of that, Hatoyama’s ideas seem unrealistic and it is highly unlikely that the Japanese government would employ them ever again. However, the fact that many of the suggestions that Hatoyama put forward were reflected in the recent report by Japanese scholars recommending that Japan change its foreign policy approach is proof that his alternative strategic vision remains relevant even today.

 

¹ “Asia’s Future” Research Group. Asia’s Future at a Crossroads: A Japanese Strategy for Peace and Sustainable Prosperity. 2023. P. 6 // URL: https://bpb-us-e1.wpmucdn.com/blogs.gwu.edu/dist/6/2307/files/2023/07/Asias-Future-at-a-Crossroads-English.pdf (access date: 05.12.2023).

² Uchida Ando Y. What Went Wrong under the DPJ? // Looking for Leadership: The Dilemma of Political Leadership in Japan / eds J. Gannon, R. Sahashi. Tokyo; New York, 2015. P. 114–115.

³ Sahashi R. The DPJ Government’s Failed Foreign Policy: A Case of Politician-Led Government Gone Wrong // Ibid. P. 143.

⁴ Helms L. Poor Leadership and Bad Governance: Reassessing Presidents and Prime Minister in North America, Europe and Japan. Cheltenham, 2012. P. 189.

⁵ Nakamura T. Japan’s Changing Security Policy and the “Dynamic Defence Force” Concept // Power Transition and International Order in Asia: Issues and Challenges / ed. P. Shearman. London, 2014. P. 112.

⁶ Brooks W.L. Stress Test for the U.S.-Japan Alliance under the Democratic Party of Japan // SAIS Review of International Affairs. 2012. Vol. 32. № 2. P. 123.

⁷ Asano K. Minshutō Seikenka no Nihon Seiji. Tokyo, 2011. P. 35.

⁸ Konishi W.S. From Rhetoric to Reality: Foreign-Policy Making Under the Democratic Party of Japan. 2012. P. 16–20 // The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. URL: https://www.yumpu.com/en/document/read/24098072/from-rhetoric-to-reality-japanese-foreign-policy-making-under-the- (access date: 01.12.2023).

⁹ Носова И.А. «Азиатский разворот» во внешнеполитическом курсе Японии (2009–2010) // Япония после смены власти / отв. ред. Д.В. Стрельцов. Москва, 2011. С. 136–137.

¹⁰ Manifesto for August 2009 Lower House Election. 2009. P. 10 // The Democratic Party of Japan. URL: https://www.dpj.or.jp/english/manifesto/manifesto2009.pdf (access date: 03.12.2023).

¹¹ Cooney K.J. Japan’s Foreign Policy Since 1945. New York, 2007. P. 36.

¹² Edström B. Japan’s foreign policy and human security // Japan Forum. 2003. Vol. 15. № 2. P. 213.

¹³ Funabashi Y. Japan and the New World Order // Foreign Affairs. 1991. Vol. 70. № 5. P. 58–74.

¹⁴ Ozawa I. Nippon Kaizō Keikaku. Tokyo, 1993.

¹⁵ Address by H.E. Dr. Yukio Hatoyama Prime Minister of Japan at the Sixty-Fourth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations // Prime Minister’s Office of Japan. URL: https://japan.kantei.go.jp/hatoyama/statement/200909/ehat_0924c_e.html (access date: 07.12.2023).

¹⁶ Hatoyama Y. A New Path for Japan // The New York Times. 26.VIII.2009.

¹⁷ Terashima J. Sekai Wo Shiru Chikara. Tokyo, 2009.

¹⁸ Asano K. Op. cit. P. 32.

¹⁹ Remarks by Prime Minister Hatoyama at the Bali Democracy Forum II. 10 December 2009 // Prime Minister’s Office of Japan. URL: https://japan.kantei.go.jp/hatoyama/statement/200912/10bali_e.html (access date: 05.12.2023).

²⁰ Address by H.E. Dr. Yukio Hatoyama Prime Minister of Japan: Japan’s New Commitment to Asia — Toward the Realization of an East Asian Community. 15 November 2009, Singapore // Ibid. URL: https://japan.kantei.go.jp/hatoyama/statement/200911/15singapore_e.html (access date: 07.12.2023).

²¹ Iwama Y. What Is a “Liberal” East Asia Policy? Japan and the DPJ Government // Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia: Architecture and Beyond / eds T.J. Pempel, C.-M. Lee. New York, 2012. P. 136.

²² Uchida Ando Y. Op. cit. P. 122–123.

²³ Hatoyama Y. My Political Philosophy // Voice. 3.IX.2009.

²⁴ Japan-Malaysia Joint Leaders’ Statement: “Enhanced Partnership for a New Frontier” // Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. URL: https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/malaysia/jointstate1004.html (access date: 07.12.2023).

²⁵ Green M. The Democratic Party of Japan and the Future of the U.S.-Japan Alliance // Journal of Japanese Studies. 2011. Vol. 37. № 1. P. 91.

²⁶ Sahashi R. Op. cit. P. 136.

²⁷ National Security Strategy of Japan. 2022. P. 2 // Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office. URL: https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/221216anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf (access date: 05.12.2023).

About the authors

Dmitry D. Filippov

Institute of Scientific Information on Social Sciences, Russian Academy of Sciences

Author for correspondence.
Email: fili-dmitrij@yandex.ru
ORCID iD: 0000-0001-9307-8584

PhD (the University of Sheffield)

Russian Federation, Moscow

References

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