The Phenomenon of Sanction in Contemporary Moral Philosophy

Two approaches to denying the existence of moral sanctions on the grounds that blame (the main candidate to be considered a moral sanction) does not meet the definition of a sanction are considered. The first approach underlines the fact that only a voluntary action directed at an offender can be called "sanction". Blame is an expression of moral evaluation, which occupies an intermediate place between reflex reactions and conscious choice, so it cannot be considered voluntary and, therefore, a sanction. However, one can clearly distinguish in blame two sides: an evaluative side, which is indeed largely involuntary, and an expressive one. The latter corresponds to the features of a voluntary action. The second approach is based on the claim that sanction presupposes the presence of preventive intentions in the mind of the individual imposing it. If blame is not based on such intentions, it cannot be a sanction. However, this conclusion is hindered by the fact that the absence of preventive intentions characterizes only truncated forms of blame, deviating from its paradigmatic model, in which blame is a message to an offender sent with the aim of changing his/her behavior. Hence, it is possible to consider blame as a moral sanction.

morality, ethics, sanctions, moral sanctions, blame, self-condemnation, voluntary, prevention