Email this article Pareto-like equilibria for problems on overlapping game sets
- Authors: Smol’yakov E.R.1
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Affiliations:
- Faculty of Computational Mathematics and Cybernetics
- Issue: Vol 93, No 3 (2016)
- Pages: 251-255
- Section: Mathematics
- URL: https://journal-vniispk.ru/1064-5624/article/view/223670
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S1064562416030030
- ID: 223670
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Abstract
The new notion of an individually Pareto equilibrium for static and dynamic conflict problems with partially overlapping game sets is proposed; this equilibrium turns out to be nonempty even in those cases where all known equilibria are empty.
About the authors
E. R. Smol’yakov
Faculty of Computational Mathematics and Cybernetics
Author for correspondence.
Email: ser-math@rambler.ru
Russian Federation, Moscow, 119991
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