Email this article Strengthened equilibrium for game problems with side interest of participants
- Authors: Smol’yakov E.R.1
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Affiliations:
- Faculty of Computational Mathematics and Cybernetics
- Issue: Vol 95, No 3 (2017)
- Pages: 259-263
- Section: Mathematics
- URL: https://journal-vniispk.ru/1064-5624/article/view/225102
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S1064562417030206
- ID: 225102
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Abstract
A strengthened equilibrium for conflict problems with partially overlapping game sets of participants is proposed, which is of substantial help in determining fair division in cooperative games and makes it possible to refine the hierarchy of all known equilibria.
About the authors
E. R. Smol’yakov
Faculty of Computational Mathematics and Cybernetics
Author for correspondence.
Email: ser-math@rambler.ru
Russian Federation, Moscow, 119991
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