SHINE AND POVERTY OF SEMANTIC PLATONISM

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Abstract

The article presents criticism of Katz’s proto-theory. Based on the principles of semantic Platonism, he offers a new understanding of the relationship between sense and reference. However, his account faces three strong objections: against non-causal ways of accessing abstract Platonic entities (Benacerraf–Field–Cheyne), against intuition as the faculty to a priori knowledge of grammar facts (Horwich–Cheyne–Oliver), and against the medial status of finite intensionals in matters for fixing the reference of linguistic expressions (Kripke–Boghossian–Kush). Without convincing answers to these objections, Katz’s proto-theory cannot be considered as a fit competitor to naturalistic theories of language.

About the authors

Andrei V Nekhaev

Tomsk Scientific Center, Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences; University of Tyumen; Omsk State Technical University

Email: a.v.nekhaev@utmn.ru
10/4 av. Akademichesky, Tomsk, Russia 634055; Ul. Volodarskogo, d. 6, Tiumen, Rossiia, 625003; Pr. Mira, d. 11, Omsk, Rossiia, 644050

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