The benefits of harm: envy as a moral catalyst in the system of "self-destructive" emotions

The article presents an analysis of the phenomenon of envy in the context of its potentially constructive moral significance, despite the prevailing ethical opinion about the "destructive" nature of this emotion. The author demonstrates that the ethical tradition of identifying envy with moral vice does not allow one to see its real impact on a person's moral life, which impoverishes ethical theory. In this connection, attempts at ethical rehabilitation of envy are being considered. The article analyzes the views of Aristotle, who attributed envy to ethically neutral passions, and representatives of classical sentimentalism (D. Hume and A. Smith), who saw it as a natural reaction to social comparison, capable of stimulating competition. The concepts of neosentimentalists are also presented: R. Solomon's theory of "hopeless" envy and its potential for self-esteem, and R. and B. Lazarus cognitive-evaluative theory of emotions, which interprets envy as an adaptive mechanism. At the same time, it is concluded that all these approaches to ethical rehabilitation are incomplete, as they do not take into account qualitative differences in motivation and the consequences of emotional experiences. Further, analyzing the ideas of Rawls the author shows how the classification of envy into general and specific ones contributed to a deeper understanding of its axiological meaning. Along with this, the article pays special attention to the contribution of S. Protasi, who, developing Rawls' ideas, offers a more detailed typology of envy, distinguishing four of its types: emulative, inert, aggressive and spiteful. The author emphasizes that it is the concept of emulative envy that allows us to reconsider the moral status of this emotion, since this form arises when one wants to achieve the same as the other, recognizing his merits and one's ability to achieve. In this case, envy acts as a moral catalyst – it motivates self-improvement and, by helping to understand true desires, promotes personal growth without carrying a destructive component.

envy, moral self-destruction, ethics, emotional transformation, social competition, ethical rehabilitation of envy, emulative envy, moral status of envy, neosentimentalism, Sara Protasi