Analysis of the North Korean-American Crisis of 2017–2018 from the Perspective of Deterrence Theory

The purpose of this article is to analyze the rise and fall of the US–DPRK crisis in 2017–2018 following North Korea’s successful nuclear test and the launch of the Hwasong-15 heavy missile, which analysts believed could reach any location within the United States. The urgency of this issue has increased with the return to power of a new Trump administration and the signing of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement between the DPRK and the Russian Federation. The author analyzes the reasons behind the unsuccessful attempts by the US to halt the DPRK's nuclear and missile programs, using deterrence theory as the analytical framework. A key component of this theory is the assumption of enemy's rationality, specifically, the American interpretation of rational behavior. The North Korean leadership's insensitivity to American threats and the apparent irrationality of its own retaliatory rhetoric led the United States to conclude that a preemptive strike would yield no clear benefits and would entail significant potential costs. In this case, reliable deterrence becomes unattainable, as the credibility of the North Korean threat cannot be accurately assessed.

North Korea, USA, strategic nuclear arms, confrontation, Singapore Summit, Hanoi Summit, deterrence theory