An approach TO COMPARe ORGANIZATION MODES OF ACTIVE AGENTS and CONTROL METHODS
- Autores: Ougolnitsky G.A1
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Afiliações:
- Southern Federal University
- Edição: Nº 3 (2022)
- Páginas: 29-39
- Seção: Control in Social and Economic Systems
- URL: https://journal-vniispk.ru/1819-3161/article/view/350863
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.25728/pu.2022.3.3
- ID: 350863
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Resumo
When interacting, active agents can behave independently, cooperate, or have hierarchical relations. In turn, a hierarchical impact may be exerted by administrative or economic methods with or without feedback. These organizational modes and control methods are systematically described based on game-theoretic models with different information structures without uncertainty. It seems crucial to compare the payoffs of separate agents quantitatively with social welfare under the organization modes and control methods. A methodology is proposed to build the systems of social and individual preferences in normal form games and determine shares when allocating the cooperative payoff. A system of relative efficiency indices is developed for detailed quantitative assessment. This methodology is illustrated by several Cournot oligopoly models.
Sobre autores
G. Ougolnitsky
Southern Federal University
Autor responsável pela correspondência
Email: gaugolnickiy@sfedu.ru
Rostov-on-Don, Russia
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