No 6 (2025)
Articles
Animals in G. W. Leibniz's metaphysics: ontological status, gnosiological aspects and ethical perspectives in the optics of modern receptions
Abstract
The article examines the ontological and epistemological status of animals in the metaphysics of Gottfried Leibniz, contrasting its conclusions with the provisions of the dualistic system of René Descartes, who reduces animals to "physical automata". The problem of dualism, to which Leibniz's philosophy responds in this study, is formulated through the concept of the "anthropological machine" of the animal-human difference (D. Agamben). The main focus of the study is aimed at analyzing the concepts of "corporeal substances" and "tiny perceptions" in Leibniz's philosophy, revealing the specificity of animal consciousness as an intermediate link between inanimate matter and reflective reason. In the context of classical and modern interpretations of Leibniz's philosophy, the authors consider how a critical understanding of the Leibnizian system allows us to problematize the factor of anthropocentrism in metaphysics, recognizing animals as bearers of non-reflexive apperception and subjects of their own "surrounding worlds" (Umwelt). The study touches upon the conceptual connection of Leibniz's philosophy with the ethological theory of J. von Uexküll and posthumanist ethics, presenting the "animal monad" as a unique perspective on the universe. The work is based on the historical and philosophical analysis of the texts of Descartes and Leibniz, a comparative study of modern interpretations of their ideas, as well as a conceptual analysis of the concepts of Leibniz's philosophy within the framework of posthumanist philosophy. The novelty of the study lies in the consideration of Leibniz's theory of apperception as animal psychology, demonstrating that Leibniz's non-reflexive awareness of perceptions serves as the basis for recognizing animals as active agents of a metaphysical order. Based on Gilles Deleuze's interpretation, it is demonstrated that Leibniz's ideas about recursive "corporeal substances" allow us to conceptualize "animal monadology" and rethink instinctive behavior not as a reflex mechanism, but as an animal form of thinking that constructs special perceptual worlds. The conclusions of the article emphasize the significance of Leibnizian metaphysics for posthumanist optics, within which animal monads are recognized as active participants in the ontological continuum. The work contributes to the actualization of Leibniz's philosophy by rethinking the status of animals in his metaphysical teaching and bringing the philosopher's intuitions closer to contemporary problems of the ontological, epistemological and ethical aspects of the philosophy of animals.
Philosophical thought. 2025;(6):1-24
1-24
The theory of "new wars" - achievements and limitations
Abstract
The subject of the research is the theory of "new wars," proposed in the late 1990s by British conflictologist Mary Kaldor. This concept represented a significant step in changing the paradigm of thinking about war within the social and political sciences. Despite criticism, the theory has gained a considerable number of supporters in many countries and has inspired numerous related concepts. However, it is essential to remember that any theory can lose its relevance over time. In this regard, we formulate the purpose of this article as an exploration of the achievements and possible limitations of the theory of "new wars." To achieve this, an analysis of the most important points of this theory has been conducted, such as the changing role of states in military conflicts and the transition of many wars into a habitual social condition of societies. The primary methodology of the research is conceptual analysis of the works of theorists from the "new wars" tradition and a systematic approach that allows for the comparison of the results of conceptual analysis with the changing specific-historical context of the 21st century. Notably, we include theorists such as Herfried Münkler and Martin van Creveld in the "new wars" framework. The main conclusions of our study identify the most significant achievements and potential limits of the "new wars theory," such as the departure from understanding wars through the lens of the state and the shift towards "thinking about war" through a broad context of social sciences. War has come to be understood as a specific social condition of society, where many actors may not have any direct connection to the state. Therefore, a wide range of social sciences must be utilized for a genuine understanding of military conflicts in the 21st century. However, this analysis leads us to the main limitation of the explanatory potential of the "new wars theory" – the specific-historical conditions that generated such wars. This is where the scientific novelty of this work lies – "new wars" should be regarded as an inevitably temporary phenomenon, with transformations that are bound to occur in the coming decades. Thus, for a proper understanding of the world around us, we must view the currently prevailing theories as something transient.
Philosophical thought. 2025;(6):25-32
25-32
Technosocial reality through the lens of Simondon's theory: individuation, collectivity, technologies, and networks
Abstract
In this article, using the key concepts (individuation, technicality, and transindividual being) of the French philosopher Gilbert Simondon, an analysis of contemporary technosocial reality is proposed, which has its roots in the discussions that began in the mid-20th century about the theory of technicality as a way of human existence alongside religion, science, and art. It follows that the new theory of "technosocial reality" arose not only at the intersection of several disciplines (philosophy of technology, sociology, and cybernetics) but also due to the evolution of technicality, which reached its culmination in network structures, turning the entire world into a technosocial construct. This is why for Simondon, networks are not just tools, but a fundamental change in worldview: the boundary between "nature" and "culture" is blurred, giving way to a unified hybrid space where people, algorithms, and infrastructure co-create reality. An interdisciplinary analysis of contemporary technosocial reality through the lens of Simondon's philosophy requires a rejection of reductionism, consideration of multiple levels, and emphasis on processuality, as well as a combination of techno-historical, systemic, and network approaches. The key tasks are: first, to see technology as co-authors of sociality; second, to reveal how the "individual" and "collective" interpenetrate in digital environments. In his works, Simondon not only rehabilitates technology but shows that technicality is a fundamental layer of culture, without which neither individuation nor collective being is possible. Unlike pessimistic views (for example, Heidegger, who saw technology as "standing reserve" – a soulless disclosure of the world), Simondon offers a positive ontology of technology, where technicality is not a threat but an equal means comparable to religion, science, and art. In this context, Simondon not only anticipates the idea of "technosociality" but also shows how technology permeates all levels of existence: 1) in the process of concretization, technology participates in the formation of the individual (for example, digital identities); 2) within collectivity, technical networks (the Internet, transportation systems) form transindividual connections, similar to religious communities or scientific societies; 3) in culture, artificial intelligence and robotics become new "authors" and redefine the boundaries of creativity, as avant-garde artists did in the 20th century.
Philosophical thought. 2025;(6):33-52
33-52
Preservation of culture as a system of values in modern conditions: challenges and prospects
Abstract
The article highlights the problem of preserving historical humanity emphasized by Karl Jaspers, analyzes modern geopolitical and psychological risks that can deform cultures as multi-level value systems and distort their transmission between generations. For an analytical consideration of the levels and ways of development of human cultures, the model of Jean Gebser's structures of consciousness, illuminated in modern philosophical, psychological and political discourse by Ken Wilber, including archaic, magical, mythical, rational and integral levels, as well as the associated model of care ethics by Carol Gilligan, describing egoistic, ethnocentric and the world-centered levels. The article analyzes the current status of Western and Russian cultural civilizations declared and implemented by the political leadership of the United States and Russia, examines and identifies key geopolitical and ideological factors that can evolutionarily or involutionarily influence the development of Western and Russian cultural civilizations. The methodological basis of the study is a comparative analysis, in which, based on the consideration of models of consciousness structures proposed by Gebser, Gilligan and Wilber, an assessment and comparison of the current statuses and directions of changes in the declared and asserted values of the West and Russia in the context of real geopolitical processes is carried out. The scientific novelty of the research lies in the comprehensive compilation and comparative consideration of philosophical views on cultures as multilevel value systems reflected in the works of Jaspers, Gebser, Gilligan and Wilber, with the involvement of the current state of Western and Russian cultures in their political expression as the subject of research. The article draws conclusions about the future of human cultures, about the factors influencing their harmonious growth and integral interaction, about the causes leading to the confrontation and degeneration of cultures. The problem of preserving historical humanity is identified and a solution is proposed in the form of strengthening cultures as value systems through a deeply interpreted concept of tradition, which is proposed to be considered and applied as the main means of preserving and transferring inherited and improved cultural experience between generations at all levels of consciousness inherent in the corresponding cultures-civilizations.
Philosophical thought. 2025;(6):53-64
53-64
The concept of "entanglement" in the philosophy of A. Noë
Abstract
The subject of this article is the philosophical analysis of the concept of "entanglement," as presented in the work of contemporary foreign philosopher A. Noë, titled "Everything is Entangled: How Art and Philosophy Make Us Who We Are." Currently, within the framework of domestic philosophy, A. Noë's work has not received adequate reflection, making the reconstruction and contemplation of the author's position presented in the book relevant. The paper outlines the philosophical potential of the category of "entanglement" and analyzes its ontological and epistemological aspects. The logic of the work suggests the reception of A. Noë's philosophical position and its comparative analysis, comparing it with the philosophical directions that have emerged within the framework of "new ontologies." A. Noë's ideas are compared with D. Haraway's concept of "tentacularity" as well as with object-oriented ontology. Special attention in the article is paid to the analysis of the role of art and philosophy as "reorganizing practices." The methodology of the research presented in the article is based on the use of systemic and dialectical approaches, which allows for the identification of characteristics and contradictions in the presented concept of "entanglement." The systemic approach reveals "entanglement" as a multi-level structure of interrelated elements (biological, technological, cultural). The dialectical approach complements this analysis by uncovering internal contradictions in the realization and understanding of "entanglement." The author concludes that A. Noë interprets the concept of "entanglement" as an epistemological and aesthetic phenomenon. The fact of "entanglement" in A. Noë's interpretation goes beyond the claims that everything is "connected" or "determined." The article notes that, despite its shortcomings (lack of conceptual clarity, metaphorical nature, and eclecticism), A. Noë's concept of "entanglement" has heuristic potential for describing the diversity of human and world relations, as well as the peculiarities of aesthetic experience as a universal optic of knowledge. A. Noë's concept of "entanglement" does not seek to take the form of a finished philosophy, a political manifesto, or a foundation for ecological discourse; it avoids the extremes of new materialism and the object-oriented approach, offering a balanced position in which the concept of "entanglement" becomes the basis for critiquing anthropocentrism while maintaining the special role of humans as active subjects. In A. Noë's concept, philosophy and art emerge not only as practices of reorganizing our experience but also as an optic for understanding "entanglement."
Philosophical thought. 2025;(6):65-84
65-84