Notions of equilibrium for differential games on intersecting game sets
- 作者: Smol’yakov E.R.1
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隶属关系:
- Lomonosov Moscow State University
- 期: 卷 52, 编号 11 (2016)
- 页面: 1469-1480
- 栏目: Control Theory
- URL: https://journal-vniispk.ru/0012-2661/article/view/154165
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S0012266116110082
- ID: 154165
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详细
We suggest new notions of conflict equilibrium and demonstrate a technique of their use for finding a solution in arbitrary game problems on a game set common for all players and especially in problems with side interests of players in the static and dynamic settings.
作者简介
E. Smol’yakov
Lomonosov Moscow State University
编辑信件的主要联系方式.
Email: ser-math@rambler.ru
俄罗斯联邦, Moscow
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