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Notions of equilibrium for differential games on intersecting game sets


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We suggest new notions of conflict equilibrium and demonstrate a technique of their use for finding a solution in arbitrary game problems on a game set common for all players and especially in problems with side interests of players in the static and dynamic settings.

作者简介

E. Smol’yakov

Lomonosov Moscow State University

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Email: ser-math@rambler.ru
俄罗斯联邦, Moscow

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