Email this article Notions of equilibrium for differential games on intersecting game sets
- Authors: Smol’yakov E.R.1
-
Affiliations:
- Lomonosov Moscow State University
- Issue: Vol 52, No 11 (2016)
- Pages: 1469-1480
- Section: Control Theory
- URL: https://journal-vniispk.ru/0012-2661/article/view/154165
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S0012266116110082
- ID: 154165
Cite item
Open Access
Access granted
Subscription Access
Abstract
We suggest new notions of conflict equilibrium and demonstrate a technique of their use for finding a solution in arbitrary game problems on a game set common for all players and especially in problems with side interests of players in the static and dynamic settings.
About the authors
E. R. Smol’yakov
Lomonosov Moscow State University
Author for correspondence.
Email: ser-math@rambler.ru
Russian Federation, Moscow
Supplementary files
