Enviar artigo por via de e-mail Notions of equilibrium for differential games on intersecting game sets
- Autores: Smol’yakov E.R.1
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Afiliações:
- Lomonosov Moscow State University
- Edição: Volume 52, Nº 11 (2016)
- Páginas: 1469-1480
- Seção: Control Theory
- URL: https://journal-vniispk.ru/0012-2661/article/view/154165
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S0012266116110082
- ID: 154165
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Resumo
We suggest new notions of conflict equilibrium and demonstrate a technique of their use for finding a solution in arbitrary game problems on a game set common for all players and especially in problems with side interests of players in the static and dynamic settings.
Sobre autores
E. Smol’yakov
Lomonosov Moscow State University
Autor responsável pela correspondência
Email: ser-math@rambler.ru
Rússia, Moscow
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