Introduction to the theory of choice and stable contracts
- Authors: Danilov V.I.1
-
Affiliations:
- Central Economics and Mathematics Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences
- Issue: Vol 80, No 4 (2025)
- Pages: 3-46
- Section: Articles
- URL: https://journal-vniispk.ru/0042-1316/article/view/306764
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.4213/rm10231
- ID: 306764
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Abstract
The paper is devoted to the presentation of the basic concepts and results of the theory of stable contract systems. This theory originated in 1962 and has significantly been developed since then. The main results (existence, polarization, latticing) were obtained in a bipartite situation, when contracting agents are divided into two groups, and contracts are concluded between agents from opposite groups. Another important limitation is that the agents' preferences are described by so-called Plott choice functions. The first part of the paper is devoted to this concept, which generalizes the concept of partial order. The second part sets out the theory of stable contracts itself.
About the authors
Vladimir Ivanovich Danilov
Central Economics and Mathematics Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences
Author for correspondence.
Email: vdanilov43@mail.ru
Doctor of physico-mathematical sciences, Main Scientist Researcher
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